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Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned
Commitment
Martha C. Nussbaum'
I begin with two stories about values in a "postmodern world"-that is,
a world in which the norms and standards by which people habitually guide
their actions have come under attack, and the norms are suddenly seen to
be nonnecessary, historical, and "all-too-human." The first story is from
Ancient Greece, where this assault on the normative began; it concerns the
skeptical philosopher Pyrrho, the legendary author of the assault. It reveals,
I think, both the intellectual deficiency and the ethical danger inherent in
many versions of the postmodern assault on normativity. The second story
comes from New York in 1991; it concerns a dramatic reaffirmation of
commitment not only to values (which frequently may be local both in
origin and in application) but also to abstract values that transcend any
particular culture and that claim to apply to all human beings as such. It
shows, I think, the ethical importance of such abstractions, despite their
dangers.
STORY 1.
Pyrrho is on the deck of a ship at sea.' A storm comes up suddenly.
The other passengers begin to rush around, filled with anxiety. Because
they have not followed the advice of philosophy to suspend their normative
commitments-because, we might say, they do not think that they live in
a postmodern world-they have definite beliefs about what is good and
what is bad, and attach considerable importance to those beliefs, as giving
them good reasons for, as opposed to simply causing, action. So they try
to protect themselves, their loved ones, their possessions-and they wonder
anxiously what is best to do. Meanwhile, on the deck of the ship, a pig
* I am very grateful to Steven Winter and Pierre Schlag for arranging the panel, and to Cass
Sunstein for comments on a previous draft.
1. The story is told in Diogenes Laertius's Life of Pyrrho, IX.66. All translations from the Greek
are my own. I discuss the ancient Greek skeptics in detail in chapter 8 of The Therapy of Desire:
Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 1 discuss some
of the modem parallels in more detail in "Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature and the Law,"
Harvard Law Review 107 (January 1994): 714-44, hereinafter "Skepticism."
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goes on eating contentedly at its trough. Pyrrho points to the pig and says,
"The wise person should live in just such freedom from disturbance."
STORY 2.
At the American Philosophical Association in 1991, the Committee on
International Cooperation and the Committee on the Status of Women
organized a panel on "Philosophy and Women in Developing Countries
Today." Four philosophers, one each from Nigeria, India, China, and
Mexico, were asked to discuss the role of philosophy in the struggle for
women's equality in their respective countries.2 My fellow American
organizers and I had long been accustomed to subtle debates about the
historical and contextual nature of ethical values, and about the inadequacy
of abstractions that are divorced from history and context. Each of our four
invited speakers-all of whom were involved in grass-roots feminist
political work in their own countries-took a very different approach. The
Nigerian philosopher, who appropriately found much to praise in her own
tradition for the large role it gives women in productive economic activity
and the related equal treatment of women with respect to nutrition and
basic health care,3 compared her tradition positively with many other
traditions in the developing world. She treated the values of equality and
autonomy as separable from any particular tradition, and as useful in
comparing one tradition with another. The other three speakers told a very
different story, in which abstract values played an even more dramatic role.
In all three papers, produced independently of each other, one found the
same arresting contrast. On the one hand, there was the traditional culture
that gave these women their history and their context; this was a context
very oppressive to women, as they easily demonstrated. (And they told
stories that were all too similar, despite the great cultural differences that
separate India from China, and both from Mexico.) On the other hand,
there was the abstract ethical language of rights, justice, equality, and
personhood-which they put forward proudly, in developing their feminist
positions, and without the embarrassment that often attends such language
in American philosophical circles. It was obvious that these women were
not detached skeptics like Pyrrho. Rather, they had definite values: they
2. Three of the papers from this session are forthcoming in Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover,
eds., Women, Culture, and Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, forthcoming 1995), hereinafter
Women, Culture: Roop Rekha Verma, "Femininity and Personhood"; Xiaorong Li, "Gender Inequality
in China"; Nkiru Nzegwu, "Recovering Igbo Tradition: A Case for Indigenous Women's Organizations
in Development." See also, in the same volume, Marty Chen, "A Matter of Survival: Women's Right
to Employment in India and Bangladesh"; and Margarita Valdes, "Inequality in Capabilities between
Men and Women in Mexico."
3. For the data, see United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1993 (New
York: Clarendon Press, 1993). For a good treatment of the sub-Saharan record on nutrition, see Jean
Dreze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (New York: Clarendon Press, 1989), 46-61; and
for a selection of pertinent data, see my "Introduction" in Women, Culture.
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seemed to think it important to refer to values that were very abstract and
that transcended their particular culture. They seemed to think it possible
to refer to and defend these values in political argument without espousing
any transcendent religion or otherworldly metaphysical entities. (Indeed,
they were all passionate secularists, which was not surprising, given the
role of traditional religion in the oppression they described.) For
philosophers Roop Rekha Verma from Lucknow, Laura Mues from Mexico
City, and Xiaorong Li from Beijing, abstract values meant the possibility
of liberation, whereas contextuality-at least of a local or traditionalist
variety-meant continued oppression by the status quo. In short, neither
they nor Nkiru Nzegwu, who was more friendly to her tradition, conceded
that they lived in a postmodern world, where "postmodern" means a world
in which we renounce commitments to abstract norms as giving us good
and justifiable reasons for conduct, which may be radically at odds with
conventions and customary practices. They did not find themselves driven
as philosophers to that conclusion; nor, clearly, did they think it a
conclusion with which they could live.
In the following remarks I look at the moral of each of these stories for
the status of our current debate about values. In discussing the first, I
explain why we need evaluative argument and reasoned evaluative
commitments in social thought, and why neither the ancient skeptics nor
the modem deconstructionists have given us reason to suspend commitment
to values as rationally justifiable. Then I turn to my second story and to
the more difficult question, the question of abstraction, and I shall perhaps
surprise my audience, and even myself, by offering a defense-a limited
defense, but a defense all the same-of the role of abstract values in ethical
argument. But before I address the main issues, I raise some points of
philosophical clarification.
I
The title of this panel is "Human Values in a Postmodern World." I find
this title slightly puzzling for two reasons. First, the title implies that a
decisive shift in ethical argument about value has occurred very recently
and that the major players in this shift are the "postmodernists," by which
I suppose one means above all the deconstructionists. But really this
debate about the ground of our normative commitments-whether it is to
be found in this world or in some other world, and whether there is any
good ground at all-goes back to the ancient Greeks,4 and can also be
found in a very similar form in ancient Indian philosophy. 5 In its modern
4. 1 discuss this debate in "Sophistry about Conventions," in Love's Knowledge: Essays on
Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 220-29.
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Western form, in which the principal target is the world-view of Christian
metaphysics, the debate is as old as Kant,6 and in most important respects
Kant's arguments still have not been surpassed.
Second, I am puzzled by the title because it suggests that we all know
what world we are living in, that all the big philosophical problems about
realism and antirealism have not only been resolved, but resolved in favor
of a form of cultural relativism defended in postmodernism. But this is far
from being the case. The modem philosophical debate about the ground
of value is complicated. It is closely linked to larger questions about the
ground of scientific judgments, and thus to highly technical debates in, for
example, the philosophy of physics, concerning the interpretation of
quantum mechanics. Other very detailed arguments concern the nature of
linguistic reference. The major players in this debate-and I will stick my
neck out here by saying that I think the deconstructionists are minor bit
players-differ on many of the most important issues. Positions on the
question of whether our judgments are about a world that is independent
of human interpretation range all the way from the modified realist view
of Donald Davidson, who takes the rather Kantian position that all rational
discourse presupposes a single conceptual scheme; 7 through the more
elastic position of Hilary Putnam, who argues that multiple world-interpre-
tations are defensible both in science and in ethics, but that we can still
justify some views as better than others without cultural relativity;' through
the more robust pluralism of Nelson Goodman, who argues that multiple
world-views are all empirically adequate, but that there are many con-
straints on the adequacy of a world version;9 on to the more sweeping
relativisms of W.V.O. Quine' ° and Richard Rorty." The issue is compli-
cated by the fact that advocates of different positions in this debate, in
particular Putnam and Rorty, call themselves "pragmatists" and trace their
arguments to the work of William James and John Dewey,' 2 while being
very much at odds over what they take James and Dewey to be up to.
There is no way of short-circuiting the job of working through these
6. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman K. Smith (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965).
7. Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
8. Different stages of Putnam's development away from metaphysical realism can be traced in
Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge, 1979); Reason, Truth, and
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Realism and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983); The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1988); and Realism with
a Human Face (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
9. See Nelson Goodman, Ways of World-Making (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978); Nelson
Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978).
10. See especially W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1969).
11. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1982); Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
12. For Rorty's pragmatism, see Consequences; for Putnam's, see especially his "Pragmatism and
Ethical Objectivity," forthcoming in a new collection of his papers, and in Women, Culture.
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arguments and making up one's own mind about what arguments one takes
to be the best. The postmodern version of the debate does not seem to me
to do this. Before advancing the argument that I take to be the best, it
seems to me, after reading Steven Winter's and Pierre Schlag's papers, that
some central terms need more philosophical clarification.
Professor Winter claims that "objectivity" is undermined by postmodern
arguments.' 3  In addition to my more general worry about that way of
characterizing where we are, I think that this very much depends on how
one defines "objectivity." The "objective" is opposed to the "subjective";
but how is it opposed? If one defines the objectivity of a judgment as
validity totally independent of what any human thinks or judges, then of
course any of the historicist views I have mentioned, even Davidson's,
undermines that sort of objectivity for values. But objectivity is frequently
defined differently, by contrast to the "subjective," or unreflective and
unsorted beliefs and preferences people happen to have. The objective is
what has passed certain tests of reflective scrutiny, and of course that need
not have anything to do with extra-human or extra-historical standards of
value.' 4  We need more clarity concerning what has and has not been
undermined, and by what argument.
There is a similar problem with the term "contingency."'' 5  The
contingent is that which may be otherwise. It is opposed to the necessary.
But in what sense? Is the necessary that which is fixed immutably in the
fabric of the universe, altogether apart from human history, or is it that
which is in some way necessary for human thought and life? If values are
human and internal to history, this does not mean that we cannot show that
some values are necessary for any human society to exist, perhaps even
necessary in order for us to think and speak at all. Nietzsche, the hero of
the postmodernists, argued, following Kant, that certain beliefs were
"necessary for life," and in that sense not at all contingent. 6 It muddies
13. Steven Winter, "Human Values in a Postmodem World," Yale Journal of Law & the
Humanities 6 (1994): 234 ("the lack of objective foundations"), 235 ("the distorting grip of these
objectivist assumptions"). This sort of denial is ubiquitous in poststructuralist writing. For some
characteristic examples, and a reasoned critique, see Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt, eds., A Mind
of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), xiii ff.
14. For one striking example of this, see Hilary Putnam, "Objectivity and the Science-Ethics
Distinction," in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds., The Quality of Life (New York: Clarendon
Press, 1993), 143-57.
15. See Winter, "Human Values," 233 ("the recognition of contingency"), 235 ("postmodernism's
most profound contribution is its radical insistence on contingency").
16. A typical example, is Nietzsche's argument that without judgments such as those involved in
logical inference "man could not live." Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966), sec. 4. See also Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), sec. 110-11, 121. Nietzsche argues that the "tyranny" of rules
is necessary for "all there is or has been on earth of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, and masterly
sureness, whether in thought itself or in government, or in rhetoric and persuasion, in the arts as in
ethics." Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 188. He continues, "What is essential 'in heaven and on earth'
seems to be, to say it once more, that there should be obedience over a long period of time and in a
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the waters to use the word "contingency" without saying what position on
this question one does or does not hold.
II
In an earlier paper that Steven Winter cites, 17 I argued that getting rid
of transcendent standards does not mean getting rid of good reasons, and
that only someone all too much in the grip of the transcendent would be
inclined to say this, someone for whom there are no ethical reasons unless
they are given from outside. 8 I have said that we can have evaluative
arguments that have force, showing that some positions are better and some
worse, without the transcendent standards that we never had anyway. I
believe that in saying this I am in at least partial agreement with Professor
Winter, who insists that the "postmodern world" is not nihilistic, or lacking
in constraints. 9 Now, in order to understand this point better, I want to
pause to examine the skeptic strategy that led to the behavior of Pyrrho on
the deck of the ship, where the pursuit of clear and certain criteria for
evaluation leads to the collapse of all evaluation.
I shall scrutinize the skeptical strategy by asking how it would handle
one problem that was central to all the women on the APA panel, a
problem that preoccupies me in my thinking about international develop-
ment: the question of women's right to work. Let me illustrate the problem
with an example that was central to Marty Chen's articulate study of the
20Bquestion. Metha Bai, a young widow in Rajasthan, needs to take a job
outside the home if she and her children are to have enough to eat. Since
she belongs to a social caste that forbids women to work outside the home,
her in-laws strenuously oppose her plan; they beat her if she tries to go out.
They prefer the ill-health and possible death of Metha Bai and her children
to the shame they would incur through her working. Interviewed by Chen,
she summarized her predicament as follows: "I may die, but I cannot go
out." It would appear that this is a case that calls urgently for moral stand-
taking.
Let me now illustrate the procedure of the ancient skeptics; in a moment
I shall show that they have numerous descendants on the contemporary
hatred of the laisser aller, of any all-too-great freedom .. " Ibid.
17. Nussbaum, "Sophistry about Conventions." In that paper my target was Stanley Fish. His new
book, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and it's a Good Thing Too (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 3-28, 307, continues the same line, reducing all reasons to causes and holding that all
evaluation is the arbitrary outcome of causal forces. I critique this argument in "Skepticism."
18. A more detailed account of the issues discussed in this section can be found in Nussbaum,
"Skepticism."
19. Winter rejects the idea of"an alarming and intolerable nihilism," arguing instead that "[tihe lack
of objective foundations does not translate into freedom from constraint. Winter, "Human Values,"
233-34.
20. See Marty Chen, "A Matter of Survival: Women's Right to Work in Rural India and
Bangladesh," in Women, Culture.
[Vol. 6: 197
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scene. First, they produce a belief, and for these purposes I shall stick to
evaluative beliefs, although in fact they do this across the board with all
beliefs. 2' Let us say, sticking with an example actually used in the
ancient texts, that it is the belief that incest is a bad thing. The skeptics
then produce from somewhere or other the opposite of this belief, showing
that it is held by somebody or other. Thus, the first belief is not uncontest-
ed. In this case, they produce the practice of incest in the Egyptian royal
family, in order to show that someone thinks incest is a good thing.22
Faced with the conflict of opposing beliefs, the follower of Pyrrho feels
their "equal weight." There seems to be nothing to do, then, but to
suspend commitment to both of them because we have available to us no
criterion for sorting things out that itself commands universal agreement.
And this suspension, the ancient Greek skeptics note, produces a delightful
state of freedom from disturbance, like the calm after the storm.2 ' They
add that it is this security and freedom from disturbance that ethical people
wanted from their ethical commitments and values anyhow; however, since
no values are ever uncontested, no values really bring this calm.
24
Faced with the case of Metha Bai, how would the skeptic proceed? Let
me imagine that Marty Chen, the fieldworker who interviewed her and
described her case, is such a skeptic. The skeptical Chen would take note
of Metha Bai's predicament and her beliefs, registering the fact that some
women think that women need the right to work outside the home. She
would also take note of the prevalent and deeply entrenched beliefs of
upper-caste Indians, to the effect that it is terrible and shameful for women
to work outside the home. Faced with this evident conflict of opposing
beliefs, Chen would suspend judgment, because it would appear that there
is something like equal weight on both sides. This suspension of judgment
leads to a state of freedom from disturbance. Chen, who was initially
inclined to be upset about Metha Bai, no longer feels the disturbing
temptation to get involved in her predicament, since she understands that
there is no resolving the matter. She can go her way unaffected.25
21. The relevant ancient texts are in Diogenes Laertius, Life of Pyrrho. See the Loeb Classical
Library edition, Lives of the Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), and Sextus
Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Professors, gathered in the Loeb Classical Library
edition of Sextus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933). The translation given in the Loeb of
Sextus is highly defective, so the reader should consult the extracts available in Julia Annas and
Jonathan Barnes, eds., The Modes of Skepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and
Anthony A. Long and David Sedley, eds., The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), 1-24, 468-88.
22. See Sextus, Outlines, 111.234.
23. Sextus, Outlines, 1.8.
24. Sextus, Outlines, 1.25. For detailed analysis and further references, see chap. 8 of Therapy and
"Skepticism."
25. This example is very close to some produced by Sextus, who mentions the pain people have
when they look at the suffering of others, and holds that this pain would be removed if we understood
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The detached skeptic will continue to act, but she will realize that
motives for action are just behavioral causes that derive from her feelings
and habits and from the customs and conventions and practices of her
society, as well as-Sextus Empiricus adds-the habits of the profession
in which she was trained. She will realize that there is no justifiable
ground for commitment to any of them, though she may continue to feel
bound by them as causes. What this means is that Marty Chen can
continue on with her professional activity of doing fieldwork and writing
up its results; she can even follow her own entrenched habits, helping
others to the extent to which it is habitual to do so, though she will cease
to feel that this help is demanded by a moral principle to which she is
committed. This is likely to have consequences in action: without a sense
of urgency about the moral commitment, one will be less likely to
undertake ambitious, costly, or risky action for the sake of doing something
about Metha Bai's predicament. It may be questioned whether, if a skeptic,
Marty Chen would ever have found herself in a rural village in India in the
first place, given that her profession can be exercised in other, more
comfortable surroundings. The moral commitment that drives her to
undertake hardship cannot be removed, it seems, without affecting the
pattern of her choices. I can add that skepticism would alter her writing as
well, for in the writing of the real-life Marty Chen one feels a powerful
compassion and anger at the injustices faced by women such as Metha Bai.
If informed by skepticism, this disturbed style of writing would be replaced
by a style more detached, distant, or even playful.
The ancient skeptics have their modern followers. They do not
characteristically call themselves skeptics, but this is on the whole because
they associate the term with modern epistemological skepticism, and not
with the very different strategy of the ancient skeptics, which is really quite
close to their own. The modern skeptic simply attempts to drive a wedge
between knowledge and belief; the ancient skeptic wants people to suspend
all their commitments, especially normative commitments. What is
especially strange is that people who think of themselves as occupying very
different political commitments join hands in following the general
skeptical path. On the left, we find versions of this argument, for example,
in both Jacques Derrida26 and Stanley Fish. To focus on the example that
is most pertinent to the law, Fish's article "Anti-Professionalism
'2 7
announces that we would have good reasons for an evaluative judgment
only if we had both universal agreement and criteria that transcended
human history. Lacking this, we must simply follow the practices of the
26. See "Skepticism" for a treatment of the complexities of this case.
27. In Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory
in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); see also the related account in
Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech.
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professions in which we are trained, viewing these as causes of action
rather than as giving sound reasons for action. This manifestation of power
takes the place of our old notions of fitness and rightness. (Note that for
Fish we are still "committed" in the sense that we follow the forces that
bear in on us. In this he is more like the ancient skeptics who insist that
skepticism does not change very much how people act, than like those who
point to some radical changes that might follow the suspension of
full-fledged commitment.)
On the right, we find a very similar pattern of argument. We find it in
many writers of the law-and-economics movement, who follow Milton
Friedman's famous dictum that concerning matters of value "men can only
fight,"28 and that matters of evaluation are irretrievably arbitrary and
subjective. I could also talk about Richard Posner here,29 but his position
is too complex to pin down quickly. But the skeptical strategy emerges
with particular clarity in Robert Bork's The Tempting of America,30 in a
chapter arguing against the idea that judges are entitled to invoke
substantive moral principles in constitutional interpretation. Bork criticizes
the Supreme Court's decisions on contraception, especially Griswold v.
Connecticut.3' He begins as the deconstructionists frequently begin, by
demanding universal agreement as the criterion of acceptability for an
ethical principle. No principles, of course, pass the test.32 Without further
ado, Bork concludes that all ethical evaluation is arbitrary; the evaluator is
"adrift on an uncertain sea," with "no principled way to make the necessary
distinctions. '33  All attempted persuasion in ethics, Bork now claims, is
really seduction. (Bork evidently has a rather low opinion of seduction,
which he takes to be altogether independent of reasons or true needs or
even good taste.) Bork concludes that cases that raise complex moral
issues should be handled by suspending judgment and turning things over
to the play of forces-in this case, to a majority vote- understood as Bork
understands voting, as simply the aggregation of subjective preferences.34
Although Bork plainly announces that he himself has strong ethical
convictions, he treats them as he does the convictions of others, i.e., as
(strong) preferences, which simply get weighed in along with other
28. Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in Daniel M. Hausman, ed., The
Philosophy of Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 212. The essay was first
published in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). In the
original version, the word "ultimately" occurs between "can" and "only."
29. See, for example, Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1981); and The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
30. Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1990), chap. 12.
31. 381 U.S. 481 (1965).
32. Bork, Tempting of America, 254, 257-59.
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preferences in arriving at the social outcome. The net result of these
statements is that Bork-though he might think himself to be making a
point about the limits of judicial action rather than a point in moral
philosophy-has actually taken a strong and controversial position in
moral/political philosophy. Namely, Bork's position is one that is skeptical
about the role of reasons in showing one moral or political position to be
on stronger ground than another; thus, for Bork, social choice is and should
be nothing other than the aggregation of all the actual preferences of social
agents.
With the left and right thus joining hands in a surprising way over the
characterization of our "postmodern" predicament, it is no surprise that we
actually find a recent book that fuses the strategies of the two groups:
Contingencies of Value, by Barbara Herrnstein Smith. Smith is a
colleague of Fish at Duke, and clearly defines herself as on the left, and yet
her book cites among its main sources of intellectual authority the writings
of Gary Becker and George Stigler.36 In fact, we find in Smith what was
bound to occur sooner or later, given the skeptical convergence I have
described: the birth of an all-American, Chicago-school economic
postmodernism. Here is how the argument goes: we cannot find either
universal agreement or transcendent extra-historical standards in matters of
value. Therefore, we have no principled way of adjudicating disagree-
ments. Because there is no way of adjudicating our disagreements and
everything is contested, our talk about evaluation must be understood using
the idea of the market, and viewing people who make value judgments as
rational maximizers of their abilities. But rationality, once again, is
understood as a psychological condition that causes actions, a way "men"
have of "fighting," and not as something that gives good, justificatory
reasons for action.
What is wrong with these arguments? Returning to Metha Bai and
Marty Chen, I shall point to three serious difficulties: an unrealistic goal,
loaded dice, and the fact that freedom from disturbance is presupposed as
the goal. 37 First, the skeptics, both ancient and modern, demand nothing
less than universal agreement as the criterion of acceptability for a
normative principle. If we come up with anyone at all who believes the
contradictory of a given proposition, this is sufficient to get us started on
the road that ends up in suspension of commitment. But why should we
think this? There are many different reasons why people have the beliefs
they have; many of these are bad reasons. It is only because the skeptic
has already given up on the distinction between reasons and causes that all
35. Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).
36. See ibid., 191-92, and chap. 6.
37. For more detail, see "Skepticism."
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values look equal. The skeptic is not supposed to be assuming this
distinction, but showing it. Until the skeptic has shown it, we should not
be troubled by the fact that Egyptians like incest (if they do) or that some
people love cannibalism. Such facts have no weight, independently of the
reasons and arguments that are given for holding the belief.
If we consider the case of Metha Bai, we see this rather clearly. Hardly
ever, when social injustice and hierarchy are present, will we find universal
agreement about a project of reform. It is no surprise that Metha Bai's in-
laws do not agree with her; it was no surprise when whites in the South
opposed the Civil Rights movement. In these cases, a claim of justice and
human need conflicts with a claim based on prejudice and entrenched
power. In real life, we do not hesitate to make these distinctions, nor do
we hesitate to say that the reasons Metha Bai gives for working are
weightier, more deserving of respect, than the reasons the in-laws give for
forbidding her to work. The absence of unanimity in no way prevents
moral argument from reaching a conclusion.
We now can notice the second serious difficulty with the fused left and
right characterization of the postmodern predicament: the skeptic really
does not bring forward arguments that are equal in force on both sides of
all questions. The movement from assertion and counter-assertion to
suspension is rigged by ignoring arguments with good, strong human
credentials that really do help people decide in life for one view as against
another, even in the absence of universal agreement. It is because the
skeptic has set the goal so unreasonably high that these humble human
arguments are of no interest to him or her. The skeptic assumes, in the act
of constructing his arguments, a stance of detachment from commitment
that is supposed to be the outcome of the arguments, not their prerequisite.
It is only because the skeptic stands back so far, refusing to be swayed by
reasons in the usual human way, that each claim seems exactly as strong
as its contradictory.
Again, think of the skeptical Marty Chen. Why has she concluded that
the arguments of Metha Bai and her in-laws have equal weight? (To the
real-life Chen, this is not at all how things seem.) It is because she has
antecedently refused involvement, refused to assess these arguments against
any moral beliefs or commitments of her own. Standing back from them,
she has seen them simply as one argument clashing against another
argument, and, seen in this way, they really do appear to have equal
weight. That suspension of commitment was supposed to be the outcome
of the argument, not its prerequisite.
What explains this departure from our usual human immersion in the
strength of reasons? The ancient skeptics are very forthright about this: it
is the allure of freedom from disturbance, the goal to which detachment
from normative commitment allegedly leads. They announce that they
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rarely get, and they allow their commitment to this goal to order the whole
enterprise, carefully devising antithetical arguments so as to bring
themselves into detachment about any proposition whatsoever. Modem
skeptics and their relatives are less forthright about this-but in Derrida's
allusions to the pleasure of "free play"; in Fish's evident pleasure in the
way the power of the profession takes its course, revealing some as
high-salaried, others as poor; in the economist's preference for low decision
costs; in Bork's preference for turning things over to the majority-we see
clear analogues to the ancient commitments. The skeptical Marty Chen I
have imagined seems to be eager not to get too close to the people she
studies, eager to avoid the disturbance of being involved in their predica-
ment. She assumes the detached posture of an onlooker watching the play
of forces because the cost of immersion and concern would be too great a
disturbance.
But then, first of all, there seems to be an internal inconsistency in the
skeptical procedure. Even though both ancient and modem skeptics deny
all normative commitments, they have to have a more than chance
commitment to this one end, since it is this end that governs their whole
procedure of argument, including the decision to turn skeptic in the first
place. What, we may ask, is the ground of this commitment? Why did the
fictional Marty Chen do her field work in the detached skeptical way,
rather than in a more compassionate way?
Secondly, we notice that the skeptic has, by pursuing this goal, omitted
something very fundamental to human life, namely the disposition to make
ethical commitments and to get upset about them. Once again, the ancient
skeptics are forthright about this. Pyrrho emulates the undisturbed pig on
the deck of a ship. On another occasion, he was confronted by a fierce
dog, and found himself committed to the normative belief that it was a
good thing to get out of there. He remarked-presumably while run-
ning-"How difficult it is entirely to divest oneself of the human being.
' 38
We see this divestment clearly in the decision of the fictional Marty Chen
to study women in India without the disturbance of compassion. In her
detached posture toward the argument between Metha Bai and her in-laws,
we feel the absence of an important ingredient of humanity.
I believe that a similar divestment occurs in the writings of Fish, Smith,
and Bork and the economists, and that it is therefore disingenuous of them
to claim to be returning us from transcendent authority to natural human
practices. Natural human practices are full of moral argument and moral
stand-taking; it is precisely not natural to view arguments of the Metha Bai
sort as simply the play of contending forces.
38. Diogenes Laertius, Life of Pyrrho, IX.66.
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It seems, furthermore, that we might not want to live in the world these
skeptics would give us. In that world there may be no fear of shipwreck
and no terror of barking dogs, but as Sextus Empiricus makes clear, there
would also be no commitment to fight for justice against a tyrant's
pressure, no commitment to engage in any sort of unpopular or radical
reform, no commitment to help a friend in trouble when help would impose
difficulty, and no commitment to help Metha Bai in her struggle for
survival. The story goes that one day Pyrrho's colleague Anaxarchus fell
into a swamp. Pyrrho sees him floundering, but walks on by without
helping. When others start criticizing him, Anaxarchus (by this time, let
us hope, out of the mud) praises Pyrrho's lack of normative commit-
ment.39 Even so, we can imagine the fictional Marty Chen, who walks
away from Metha Bai, winning the praise of Stanley Fish. Fish, by way
of characterizing his theoretical position, describes himself as the sort of
character who cannot remember a commitment for more than a few hours.
Inl
All this shows us that we had better hesitate before we try to do without
commitments to definite values and without the practices of justifying and
reason-giving. It doesn't yet show that we should favor the abstractions
described so vividly by Pierre Schlag. As Schlag argues, abstractions
frequently serve to conceal the historicity and humanity of values, and thus
make us think we are bound by them even when it might be best for us to
reexamine and alter our commitments.' Nevertheless, I want to take on
the difficult task of saying something on behalf of abstract values. In the
process, I shall use examples from Plato, where the push to the abstraction
Schlag describes got going in the Western tradition, and I shall also, as
before, use the example of Metha Bai and Marty Chen.
What, then, is abstraction good for in value-talk? Or, to put things
Nietzsche's way, 41 what is the value of these values? I suggest four roles
that the creation of detached and to some extent acontextual norms might
play in ethical life.
A
First, and most obviously, there is the point developed by Pierre
Schlag: sometimes, indeed, the appeal to abstraction is a way of stopping
39. Ibid., IX.6.
40. Pierre Schlag, "Values," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 6 (1994): 219, 224.
41. See, for example, Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. W. Kaufmann (New
York: Vintage, 1967), preface section 3:
[U]nder what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? and what value
do they themselves possessl Have they hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity? Are they
a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them,
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debate by saying that there is something unchanging out there, and we are
bound by it. To his son, who proposes to beat him, Aristophanes's
character Strepsiades points to the laws of the external (as he thinks) value-
order. The son points out that this is a human order, and, since he is a
human being, he can make a new order. It might have been better for this
son to have gone on believing in the external. 2
This order-giving role for abstract values is defended not only by old
metaphysical types, but by some of the postmodernists themselves. Many
philosophers who actually think values are historical and contextual also
think that it is dangerous to let people recognize this, because if they do
they will not feel as bound and will have a tendency to behave badly. This
argument has been made in different ways by Nietzsche43 and by Charles
Taylor,44 both of whom are inclined to believe that people will not prove
capable of reliably binding themselves to a moral way of life without the
belief (even if false) that there is an order "out there" commanding their
actions.
I am more optimistic than either of these philosophers about the
possibility of a human rational community. I believe that we have a
number of attractive models for the rational justification of core political
values available in modem moral/political philosophy. These models
include, but are not limited to, those offered by the American pragmatists,
by the Kantian/liberal tradition as exemplified in John Rawls's A Theory
of Justice, by the theory of communicative action developed in the work
of Jirgen Habermas, and by the view of human capability and functioning
developed by Amartya Sen.45 These views differ, but in some especially
crucial ways they overlap; above all, in their strong defense of political
liberty and autonomy. I see no reason to think that argument among
partisans of different views has come to an impasse in our democracy; the
convergence among the views I have just mentioned, and between all of
42. Aristophanes, Clouds, ed. Kenneth J. Dover (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).
43. Consider especially the essay "On Truth and Lying in the Extra-Moral Sense," in which
Nietzsche argues that coherent discourse would not be possible if we were at all times aware of the
human origins of our distinctions and categories. Gay Science, sec. Il1 argues in a related way that
lack of awareness of the noncorrespondence of our categories to any immutable and ahistorical reality
is highly functional: "At bottom every high degree of caution ... and every skeptical tendency
constitute a great danger for life." See also Gay Science, sec. 121 ("We have arranged for ourselves
a world in which we can live-by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest,
form and content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life."). On the special danger
posed by awareness of the "death of God," see ibid., sec. 125, in which the speaker doubts that human
beings will be capable of ordering their own ethical lives without the illusion of an externally given
order. This is the worry developed in the final section of Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self: The
Making of the Modem Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
44. See Taylor, Sources of the Self chap. 25.
45. On the pragmatists, see Hilary Putnam, "Pragmatism and Objectivity," in Women, Culture; John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). See also John Rawls,
Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Jirgen Habermas, A Theory of
Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). Among the works of
Amartya Sen, see especially Choice, Welfare, and Measurement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).
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these and some core features of the American constitutional tradition, gives
us reasons for optimism. And recent reflections on the structure of moral
justification among persons who disagree has supported that optimism
further.46 There is no way of briefly indicating the arguments I have in
mind; a sketch would be a parody, omitting the subtleties of comparison
that would make the convergence interesting. I therefore simply state the
belief that those postmodernists who dismiss the whole idea of getting
agreement on values have done so prematurely, usually without working
through such arguments as I have mentioned.
Let me return here to Metha Bai. We find in her case that much of the
trouble comes from a certain sort of abstraction, which for far too long has
bound people's behavior as if from without. Far from ordering beliefs in
a fruitful way, the Hindu caste system, thought of as "out there," simply
fortifies people's resistance to legitimate human claims. If we were to
remove from these caste norms their sense of externality, we would not, I
believe, have a standoff. We would be able to present a very powerful
moral argument in support of Metha Bai's claim to work. This argument
would make use of nontranscendent abstractions such as the right to food,
personhood, and autonomy. Even if we could not persuade the actual in-
laws of Metha Bai-for they are probably using her for their own selfish
ends and are not really interested in engaging in argument-we could
convince the local government, or the local development authority, that
Metha Bai's autonomous choice to work should be respected. Getting rid
of the alleged authority of the transcendent will permit the good human
abstractions to have their full argumentative weight.
B
To appeal to an abstraction such as Justice or Personhood is a way of
saying that we are appealing to standards that are above and beyond our
momentary whims and preferences. We are expressing a commitment not
to be ruled by whim and preference. We are saying that there is something
very important that binds us, whether we feel like it or not. In effect, we
are expressing a mistrust of the preference or desire of the moment,
whether our own or that of others. We are recognizing that these
preferences may have been deformed by lack of information, by greed, by
appetite, by many things that do not represent the best of which we, and
our reflection, are capable. This clearly need not mean that the abstract
standard is extra-historical. It can be a way of talking about the gap
between a deep layer of reflection and a superficial impulse. When Plato's
Cephalus says that Justice is telling the truth and paying back what you
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owe," he means that you do it, even when you do not feel like it, because
you have endorsed this norm at a level of your personality deeper than the
way you happen to feel.
To put this point slightly differently, speaking abstractly can be a way
of expressing the special reverence and awe with which we regard certain
ethical norms. We picture them as if they stood outside of us, even though
in a sense we are well aware that they stand within us, so that we can
express our wish to be bound by them at all times, even when we wish to
do otherwise. One of the most famous and moving examples of this
attitude is the conclusion of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, where he
writes: "Two things fill the human mind with ever-increasing awe: the
starry sky above me and the moral law within me. 48 Kant here explicitly
denies that the moral law is external. What he says is that he regards its
presence in himself with the same awe with which he views the heavens.
Similarly, in the passage that is probably the source for Kant's imagery
here, Seneca writes to his friend Lucilius that the Stoic, unlike conventional
religious people, has no need of worshipping at a shrine or imploring a
statue: "The god is near you, with you, inside you. This is what I'm telling
you, Lucilius: a holy spirit sits inside of each of us... and as it is treated
by us, so it treats us."' 9 The letter continues with a moving and beautiful
comparison of the inside of a person's moral world to a deep dark grove
full of ancient trees, which inspires awe by its depth, loftiness, and solitude.
Talk of abstract values can be signals of this sense of divinity.
Thus the appeals to Justice and Personhood that I encountered so
frequently in the writings of my panelists at the APA session, recording
judgments based on the experience of hierarchy and injustice, were ways
of saying to their society: "We will not allow ourselves to be ruled by
people's unexamined habits and preferences. We claim the right to be
ruled by something above that, something more worthy of the respect of all
reasonable people." It is no surprise that such appeals to abstract values
are especially common when an oppressed group is attempting to vindicate
its claims against entrenched tradition and hierarchy.
Moreover, when a value so respected clashes with another one that is
equally deserving of our respect-let us say, Justice with Liberty-we
cannot dispose of its claim lightly, nor reduce it to merely a quantity of
something else. We will in that case think of the conflict as tragic, in a
way that other conflicts are not. In that sense, the recognition of these
binding abstractions, each distinct from every other, each continuing to
47. Plato, Republic, 331AB. Cephalus in fact believes that the values have an external religious
origin, but that is not a necessary concomitant of this sort of value-talk.
48. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill Educational Publishing, 1956).
49. Seneca, Moral Epistle, 41 (my translation). For a reasonably good edition, see the Loeb
Classical Library translation by R.M. Gummere (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925).
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exert its claim, generates an attitude to the conflict of values that is
opposed in spirit to the attitude of economic utilitarianism, and, I think,
opposed in a deep and a good way.5° Some moral views-notably those
associated with cost-benefit analysis-reduce tragic conflicts of values to
choices in which an agent weighs up the costs and benefits. The view I
recommend, by contrast, recognizes that in a case in which two major
values collide, even when we can decide which option for action is
preferable on balance, the losing option may continue to exert a moral
claim if it is a value to which we have given our commitment. The fact
that events have produced a situation in which we cannot do justice to all
the claims to which we are committed does not mean that we are no longer
committed to all of them. Thus in ancient Greek ethics, the recognition
that there are many gods, that one must honor all the gods, and that the
gods do not always agree generates a sense of the binding force of each
separate ethical obligation, even in circumstances of tragedy.5' This sense
of tragedy remains alive even for those for whom the divinities in question
are seen as human in origin; indeed it is important to point out that many
ancient Greek divinities are difficult to distinguish from ethical abstractions
that do not have transcendent status. Antigone, announcing her commit-
ment to the binding claim of family love, even in tragic circumstances,
points to the existence of "unwritten laws" that transcend human life. 2
But other characters similarly placed simply speak of the obligations
imposed by virtue and loyalty, taking these to have a merely human
origin. 3 The point of alluding to abstractions remains much the same,
and it is thought to be possible so to allude to them, whether or not one
believes in their transcendence. 54
This recognition of tragedy has several serious consequences for the
ethical life. First, it means that we will seek ways to make good on our
commitment to a value that has lost out, for example, by making repara-
50. Oddly, Kant himself does not take up this attitude toward tragedy, because, I think, he is
reluctant to admit that worldly circumstances can have such power over one's capability for goodness.
On this, see my The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chap. 2.
51. See ibid.
52. Sophocles, Antigone, lines 454-55; see Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, chap. 3.
53. See Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, chaps. 2 and 11 for discussion of examples in tragedy
and Aristotle. An excellent recent treatment of the whole issue, and of Aristotle's position, is in Michael
Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). For contemporary legal
consequences of this way of viewing conflict, see Cass Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation
in Law," Michigan Law Review 92 (February 1994): 779. An excellent treatment of the whole issue in
connection with the criticism of utilitarian models of deliberation is in Henry Richardson, Practical
Reasoning about Final Ends (forthcoming 1995).
54. Of course, it would not be possible to admit tragic conflict if one believed that the world were
governed entirely by divine justice; hence, Christian ethical views often have difficulty with the topic.
Aquinas famously holds that if two values appear to conflict there must be some error, for otherwise
the agent's scheme of imperatives would be logically inconsistent. For an effective discussion of the
difference between the ancient Greek and the Christian views, see Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue
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tions, or by devoting particular care to that area of our lives at other times.
Second, it means that we will seek to remake the world in such a way that
such conflicts more rarely arise. The recognition, for example, that many
parents face painful conflicts between their commitment to and love of their
children and the demands of their work can be the beginning of a creative
rethinking of the structure of work, until a structure is found that can do
justice to all of the claims, or at least do far better by them. If the conflict
is never seen as a conflict, the rethinking is less likely to take place.
C
To appeal to abstract values can also be to assert that there are ethical
standards that are independent of the norms and traditions of a particular
culture, standards that can be argued to be valuable for human beings
independent of the local standards that prevail. To invoke these values is
thus not only to refuse to be ruled by unexamined preference and habit, it
is to refuse also, at times, to be ruled at all by one's tradition, where that
tradition is seen as a source of pervasive injustice. It is this sort of appeal
to abstraction that I heard in the papers of Li, Verma, and Mues at the
APA session. It is this sort of appeal to a right to work that Chen makes
on behalf of Metha Bai. In general it is important for oppressed groups
who fare badly in their traditions to be able to appeal to something that is
not only outside of unreflective opinion, but also "outside" of their history
and practices in this sense. This of course does not mean that justice and
equality and personhood are supposed to be extra-human and ahistorical
standards. For some philosophers who talk this way (e.g. Plato) they are;
for others (Socrates, Aristotle, Kant, Mill), as for my secularist panelists,
they are not." I find it very instructive that Verma and her fellow
panelists went to the Kantian enlightenment like a shot-as if it were an
oasis in the desert-and not to postmodernism or relativism of any kind.56
I think we should not forget the liberating role that such value-talk can
play, in asserting the claims of the powerless to a form of life more in
keeping with human dignity and personhood. Verma appeals to an abstract
Kantian notion-the notion of personhood-to describe what women in her
tradition lack, and lack on account of a history and tradition that have
portrayed women as essentially dependent and inferior beings. She argues
55. Nor does it imply that there is nothing at all inside the tradition in question to support the
appeal: often there may be, but in a temporally or culturally remote stratum of the culture's
value-scheme. On India, see Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, "Internal Criticism and Indian
Relativist Traditions," in Michael Krausz, ed., Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre
Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1989), 299.
56. In general, despite the bad reputation of Kant among many feminists, Kantian ideas of respect
for personhood are a deep part of many feminist arguments. Even Kant's much-attacked views on
marriage have insights of serious value. See Barbara Herman, "Could it Be Worth Thinking about Kant
on Sex and Marriage?" in A Mind of One's Own, 49-68.
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that we need to move beyond the local to the abstract, in order to describe
a goal that women can endorse as their own.
D
Finally, the appeal to abstract standards can help us to systematize our
beliefs and preferences. If we think of Justice as a single, abstract notion,
then we are naturally led to ask the sort of irritating question Socrates
repeatedly asks: What is justice? This question makes a big difference,
since people usually turn out to hold inconsistent beliefs on important
matters, and when this is pointed out to them they will shift their
ground." The great generals Laches and Nicias find out that they have
inconsistent beliefs about courage; the good and just man Cephalus finds
out that his account of justice will not survive his own scrutiny of cases;
the self-styled religious expert Euthyphro finds out that he is unable to tell
a straight story about what piety is. 58 In all these cases, if the person
questioned had simply interrupted the conversation by saying, "What is all
this abstract talk anyway? I want to talk about my own particular acts, not
about abstractions," then the process of self-knowledge and social
understanding would have been short-circuited.59 The refusal to investi-
gate the abstract universal concept in such cases is a refusal to look for a
deeper consistency and unity in one's own commitments. Such a person
would never have learned a crucial fact about himself, namely, that his
beliefs are internally in disorder, and incapable of offering consistent
guidance. The Platonic dialogues are full of instructive examples of this
sort of evasion. Meno would have made a good postmodernist. He says:
What's all this abstract talk, Socrates? Virtue is one thing for a man,
another thing for a woman. It's all contextual. 6° But by failing to follow
the Socratic question through all the way, he never gets to the deeper social
understanding that, in the Republic, prompts a radical challenge to
traditional female roles in the name of the singleness of virtue.61
By demanding consistency and a deeper reflective ordering of beliefs,
Socrates was not demanding anything extra-historical. His demand was
perfectly comprehensible to his interlocutors as exemplifying a norm of
reason to which they paid lip service at least, even if they did not follow
it out in practice. What Socrates was demanding, in effect, was not a
departure from the practices of humanity, but a more serious and deeper
57. On this aspect of Socrates's activity, see Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral
Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
58. See, respectively, Plato, Laches, Republic 1, Euthyphro.
59. Cephalus does short-circuit it, by leaving the discussion to attend to the sacrifices; but his son
Polemarchus takes up the argument.
60. See Plato, Meno, 71E-72A.
61. Republic V, 459 A ff. See the excellent account of this passage in Susan Moller Okin, Women
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exercise of these practices, in keeping with the idea that "the unexamined
life is not worth living. 62  This idea, as he points out, is a peculiarly
human one, for, as Plato's Symposium puts it, "no god does philosophy.
63
Only humans both can and need to sort things out by the work of their
reason, since only they are both capable of this sort of reasoning and in
need of the practical guidance it can give.
IV
Now of course all of this is subject to abuse, as Pierre Schlag's paper
argues. Abstract value-talk may conceal manipulative intentions; it may
obscure the issue, rather than clarifying it. It may short-circuit the work of
reflection and argument, by suggesting that what is right to do is given in
heaven, and we need not work to find it. It may abnegate responsibility by
representing the choices as dictated from outside, rather than chosen by us.
All these are indeed serious dangers, and the recent criticism of metaphysi-
cal realism and abstraction in philosophy has done a great service by
alerting us to these dangers. But let us also not forget the positive role that
the moral abstractions of the Enlightenment can play, in a world increasing-
ly riven by all sorts of particularism and contextualism and religious
communitarianism, many of them quite horrifying, most of them dangerous
to the well-being of women and of ethnic and sexual minorities.
Steven Winter concludes that the "real lesson" of my story of the APA
panel is that even the "putatively 'universal' and 'abstract' normative
values"-including liberal Enlightenment values-have a particular
contingent historical origin. 64 My APA panelists were able to invoke the
abstract values of justice and personhood only because those values had
emerged already "through the divergent processes of cultural develop-
ment. ' 65 He concludes that "the relativism of human moral systems can
thus be seen as an adaptive mechanism essential to any human (which is
to say fallible) normative enterprise. We have no reason to want to bring
our moral versatility to a stop, and much reason to carry on with it.''66 I
am not sure that I have perfectly understood what Winter is arguing here,
but what he seems to say is that the values that empowered these women
are (obviously) products of human history and that this therefore gives us
62. Plato, Apology, 38A.
63. Symposium, 204A (my translation):
None of the gods does philosophy or desires to become wise-for they are already. Nor, if there
is anyone else who is wise, does that person do philosophy. Nor again do those who are
completely uneducated pursue philosophy or desire to become wise. For this is the difficult thing
about lack of education, that one is not noble or wise but one seems to oneself to be sufficient.
But one doesn't desire something whose lack one doesn't recognize in oneself.
This poignant diagnosis of the deformation of preferences has many contemporary applications.
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reason to think that, in general, what is produced by human history is
adaptively valuable, and gives us much reason to endorse the variety and
local adaptiveness of moral systems. I do not agree. The fact that the idea
of women's right to work emerged from history does not give us any
reason at all to endorse the Hindu values that denied Metha Bai the right
to work, or to see those values as adaptively valuable. Some things that
emerge from history are good, and some are very bad. The fact that
history did turn up some values that are good for women's survival and
flourishing should not lead us to deny that much of human history has been
gruesomely bad for women, and not adaptively valuable for them in any
way. This seems to me to be a version of the skeptical maneuver I am
criticizing: once we recognize that the values involved in our moral debates
are human and historical, all then seem to have equal weight. But they do
not have equal weight, and the bare fact that a human society invented
something gives it no claim at all to our respect.
I remain in favor of a norm of justice that is not defined solely by
abstract rules, but is completed by the particular understanding of the
complexities of actual historical cases.67 I continue to believe that the
moral abstractions of the Enlightenment need to be completed by a more
historically and contextually sensitive understanding of particular ethical
situations. I continue to think that some allegedly Enlightenment-based
conceptions of impartiality and neutrality err by an excessive detachment
from the facts of history and from the experiences of real people. But to
criticize the Enlightenment in this way is not to jettison its central insights.
Among the great achievements of human ethical life within history is
developing the capabilities of transcending local and partisan interests and
striving toward conceptions of flourishing, of justice, and of citizenship that
apply impartially to male and female, black and white, foreigner and
neighbor, gay and "straight," no matter what local conventions and
practices say or do not say. As Professors Verma, Li, and Mues clearly
saw-and saw, on account of their oppression, more clearly than their
hosts-abstract values can aid us in forging such a conception of world
citizenship and even-handed justice, especially when local preferences are
blind and local practices are cruel.
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